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Unlawful Command Influence: Why we don’t care about war crimes anymore

The single point of failure for military law, regardless of specific nation, comes in the form of unlawful command influence (UCI). It occurs when a commander interferes in the administration of military justice at the investigation, pretrial, trial, sentencing, and post-sentencing phases to achieve a personally desired outcome. Essentially, an official who is by law empowered to give binding commands puts their thumb on the scale of justice. This article describes the steady, deliberate erosion of military law and the laws of war in the United States as the most senior officials decide the preferred results. Every instance of unlawful command influence is corrosive and an ideological and political pattern can be fatal.

1. US Military Law, the short version

American military law stems from the Constitution. It gives Congress is the authority under Section 8, Clause 14 “[t]o makes Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”1 The different branches of the United States Armed Forces are bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), first established in 1950 to replace the earlier Articles of War. In addition to prescribing rules of evidence and procedure, the UCMJ contains fifty-seven punitive articles which detail the most serious criminal offences, provisions that incorporate other federal laws, and ‘catch-all’ articles aimed at punishing conduct detrimental to military discipline.2 The UCMJ provides service members with rights and privileges comparable to those afforded to defendants under federal, and state laws, albeit with some notable differences. A General Court-Martial (GCM) is reserved for those bound over for the most serious offences, such as rape, murder, and treason. Most violations of the laws of war are prosecuted there.3 An accused is provided with military defense trial counsel free of charge and can retain civilian attorneys at their expense. While courts-martial are constitutionally exempt from the grand jury requirement, a military accused is afforded an Article 32 hearing, where a Preliminary Hearing Officer makes a recommendation as to whether probable cause exists to send the case forward.4 At a court-martial, consistent with protections of the US Constitution, the accused has the right to testify or to refuse to testify with no negative inference being drawn. In the same vein, the accused has the right to question all witnesses for the prosecution and to call any witnesses in support. They can also represent themselves, though this is strongly discouraged for obvious reasons.5 Courts-martial have their own version of a jury – a “panel” – composed of serving military personnel. The decision to convene a court-martial lies completely with the “convening authority,” usually the most senior officer at a military installation – meaning a general officer – who also selects the panel members and affirms any sentence of the court.6 They can likewise amend or overturn the verdict in some instances.7 Under the Constitution and the National Security Act of 1947, the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense are at the apex of this command structure with the power to intervene; formerly, it was a power rarely used.

2. Unlawful Command Influence

Article 37 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice specifies “No person subject to [the UCMJ] may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial … or any member thereof …”8 UCI can also separately create due process concerns, where for example unlawful influence undermines a defendant’s right to a fair trial or the opportunity to put on a defense.

There has been a significant line of cases to assist the court in recognizing and applying the prohibition against UCI.9 The party making the allegation must show: (1) facts, which if true, constitute unlawful command influence; (2) that the proceedings were unfair; and (3) that the unlawful command influence was the cause of the unfairness.10

In plain terms,

“A provision within the UCMJ provides that it is improper and unlawful for any person to attempt to influence the action of an appointing or reviewing authority or the action of any court-martial in reaching its verdict or pronouncing sentence. In modern practice, the most common but nebulous type of UCI is the appearance of UCI. Its appearance exists where an objective and disinterested observer who is fully informed of all of the facts and circumstances would harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of the court-martial proceedings.”11

Instances of UCI predate the current Uniform Code of Military Justice, and was one of the reasons why the UCMJ was codified.12 Indeed, the presence of rules against UCI in military justice is viewed as foundational beyond the courtroom. In the words of the U.S. Army’s 22nd Chief of Staff, General George H. Decker, “it is essential that our excellent court-martial system generate public confidence in the basic fairness of the administration of military justice. No other single factor has greater tendency to destroy public confidence in the system than allegations of [unlawful] ‘command influence.’”13

The Army JAG Center notes, “Unlawful command influence is divided into two types: accusatory, that is, unlawful influence in how the case is brought to trial; and adjudicative, that is, unlawful command influence in how the case is tried.” This includes the sentencing and post-sentencing phases.14

To date, UCI has been exclusively used on behalf of defendants who alleged detrimental command interference at some stage in investigative or judicial proceedings. The drafters of Article 37 and the military courts of appeal in the years that followed never conceived of a situation where unlawful command influence benefitted a defendant and disabled impartial military justice in war crimes cases.15 But that is the place where we are now. This begs the key question, does Article 37 apply in cases where the commander in chief of the armed forces uses UCI against the prosecution and the military justice system as a whole?

3. United States v. Clint Lorance

On 2 July 2012, in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, First Lieutenant Clint Lorance was leading a platoon16 patrol of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division when three Afghan men on a motorcycle were spotted some 180 metres away. The men were unarmed, yet Lorance ordered one of the privates in his unit to shoot them – the private deliberately missed – and the Afghans ran for help to members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) that accompanied the Americans.17 The ANA soldiers refused to intervene and when the three men turned to leave, Lt. Lorance ordered a soldier in a gun truck to kill them. Two died, and the third escaped.18 Members of Lorance’s platoon, who despised their officer for a number of reasons, reported the killings.19 At his court martial in August 2013, nine members of Lorance’s unit appeared for the prosecution. He was convicted of murder, obstruction of justice, and lesser charges, and sentenced to 20 years confinement, dismissal from the Army, and forfeiture of pay. The sentence was upheld by the Army Court of Criminal Appeals in 2017.20

His conviction was taken up almost immediately as a cause célèbre by groups such as the United American Patriots, which provides a wide range of support to Americans accused of committing war crimes. This was seconded by the Republican Party in Illinois which unanimously approved an appeal to then-President Donald Trump to pardon Lorance.21 Texas Congressman Louis Gomert, founder of the “Congressional Warriors for Justice,” organized a letter to the Army Clemency and Parole Board, urging Lorance’s immediate release.22 President Obama had refused all entreaties for a pardon.

The commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and the Army Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Lorance’s appeal, confirming his sentence, with the Army general removing one year for the time Lorance served in pre-trial confinement.

Following strident defense of Lorance on FOX News by commentators Pete Hegseth (now the US Secretary of Defense) and Sean Hannity, President Trump awarded a full pardon on November 15, 2019.23 In promulgating this get-out-of-jail-free decree, the White House added, “For more than two hundred years, presidents have used their authority to offer second chances to deserving individuals, including those in uniform who have served our country. These actions are in keeping with this long history. As the President has stated, “when our soldiers have to fight for our country, I want to give them the confidence to fight.”24Since his release, Lorance has appeared on stage at political rallies with Trump25. Freed from disqualifying legal impediments, he attended law school in Virginia and now practices in St. Louis, Missouri .26

The UCI in this instance is post-conviction – freeing a convicted defendant for political, not evidentiary reasons. The subtextual message sent to Army authorities was clear: prosecuting Americans for killing Afghans is unwelcome; stop doing it. The Army listened, and there were no further war crimes prosecutions following Trump’s decision to pardon Lorance.27

4. United States v. Matthew Golsteyn

In March 2010, Major Matthew Golsteyn was serving in B Co., 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group in Marjah, Afghanistan. After two Marines were killed in a roadside bomb attack, Golsteyn received information of uncertain provenance that a local villager named Rasoul was the bombmaker. Acting on his own initiative and accompanied by another soldier, Golsteyn snatched Rasoul and killed him, then hiding the body. He later returned with more men and took the corpse to a burn pit on the military base, destroying any traces of the crime.28 No one reported the incident and no further action followed until 2011 when Golsteyn underwent a polygraph examination as part of his application to the Central Intelligence Agency. He admitted to the polygrapher that he had murdered Rasoul, leading to an investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation Division.29

The investigation was closed quietly and resulted in Golsteyn’s Silver Star and Distinguished Service Cross medals being revoked before presentation. Two years later, he faced a retention board that recommended discharge for conduct unbecoming an officer and misconduct, moral, or professional misconduct. Specifically, that he “shot an Afghan…and then took steps to cover it up.” Interviewed on Fox News in 2016, he was asked if he killed a suspected bomb-maker and responded, “Yes.”30

Now that the matter was in the public spotlight, the Army had little choice but to reopen an investigation into the killing, resulting in a charge of murder in 2018. That effort was short-lived. Appeals to Trump from the United American Patriots and the usual coterie of Republican congressmembers and indignant letters from Republican voters had the desired result.31 In December 2018, Trump wrote on Twitter, “At the request of many, I will be reviewing the case of a “U.S. Military hero,”

Major Matt Golsteyn, who is charged with murder. He could face the death penalty from our own government after he admitted to killing a Terrorist bomb maker while overseas. @PeteHegseth @FoxNews.” Trump issued a pre-trial pardon to Golsteyn on November 15, 2019, ending the Army’s belated criminal inquiry. In the pardon announcement, the White House added, “Clemency for Major Golsteyn has broad support, including from Representatives Louie Gohmert, Duncan Hunter, Mike Johnson, Ralph Abraham, and Clay Higgins, American author and Marine combat veteran Bing West, and Army combat veteran Pete Hegseth.”32

However, the commander of Army Special Forces Command, LTG Francis Beaudette, refused an appeal to restore Golsteyn’s Special Forces tab, and a review board convened afterward likewise refused to restore either the SF tab or his Distinguished Service Medal. Despite the pardon, the Board ruled that the military record of Golsteyn’s actions would not be purged.33

The UCI here in the pretrial stage directly contradicts the rules of military justice set out by the Judge Advocate General.

5. United States vs. Edward Gallagher

Eddie Gallagher was a Chief Petty Officer assigned to Seal Team 7 in Mosul during the fight to retake the city from the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2017.

Gallagher was arrested in 2018, charged with murder, attempted murder, obstruction of justice, and destruction of evidence. The SEALs in his unit had made multiple reports that his conduct violated the rules of engagement (ROE) and the laws of war, but no action resulted. He bragged to his troops that he had killed three people a day for 80 days.34 The gravamen of the charge was the murder of a wounded 17-year-old ISIS prisoner. Witnesses said he walked up to the teenager after announcing, “He’s mine,” and stabbed the victim to death with his hunting knife. It went further. Gallagher decided to hold his 5-year reenlistment ceremony over the corpse and photographed the event. He text-messaged a friend a photo of him holding the dead Khaled Jamal Abdullah’s head by the hair with the caption, “Good story behind this, got him with my hunting knife.” He threatened retribution if anyone reported the killing.

Despite the apparent strength of the prosecution case, there were problems. Gallagher was arrested nearly a year after the killing, leaving Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) agents with no body or crime scene to examine. Unsurprisingly, some fellow SEALs were reluctant to testify or changed their earlier statements to investigators. At the court martial, the defense contended that Gallagher merely stabbed an already-dead Abdullah, who expired from his earlier wounds, and was only bragging when he made up the story about the murder. One witness, Special Operator First Class Corey Scott, testified under an immunity agreement with the prosecution but on the witness stand confessed that he had killed Abdullah by cutting off his airway, and Gallagher had nothing to do with the death.35 It was a brazen instance of perjury, from the prosecutor’s view, but there was nothing they could do – their hands tied by the immunity agreement once Scott made the statement in open court. The case effectively collapsed.36

The panel acquitted Gallagher on six of the seven charges, finding him guilty of “wrongfully posing for an unofficial picture with a human casualty.”37 Gallagher had already served more than the UCMJ statutory maximum while in pretrial confinement and thus he walked away a free man. Gallagher was demoted in rank from Chief Petty Officer to Petty Officer First Class and allowed to remain in the Navy.

Trump and then-Fox News personality Pete Hegseth, along with the United Americans Patriots (UAP), and Congressman Duncan Hunter38 became involved at an early stage; the UAP, in particular, helped raise money for the defense. Hegseth sold the idea of a pardon to Trump.39 In October 2019, Trump discussed the matter with the Chief of Naval Operations.40 The next month, Trump went further, ordering Gallagher restored to his original rank, despite the court martial recommendation.41 After Gallagher appeared on Fox News without authorization and described his SEAL superiors as “a bunch of morons,” the new SEAL commander Admiral Green ordered a review to determine whether Gallagher should be stripped of his Trident (SEAL qualification badge). Trump then took to Twitter: “Navy Seal Eddie Gallagher will be on @foxandfriends this morning at 7:30 A.M. Have no fear, all will end well for everyone!”42 and still later, “The Navy will NOT be taking away Warfighter and Navy Seal Eddie Gallagher’s Trident Pin. This case was handled very badly from the beginning. Get back to business!”43 At a rally on November 26, Trump said, “I stuck up for three great warriors against the deep state. And you know what I’m talking about. I had so many people say, ‘Sir, don’t think you should do that.”44

One of the other “great warriors” was First Lieutenant Michael Behenna, who murdered a prisoner by putting a grenade under his head. Trump pardoned him on 6 May 2019.45

Gallagher retired from the Navy in November 2019 with full pension and benefits. 46 Eddie and Andrea Gallagher appeared in the Apple TV production, The Line, about the incident.47

6. Blackwater and the Nisour Square Massacre

On September 16, 2006, employees and gun trucks of the private military contractor (PMC) firm Blackwater were escorting a US embassy convoy through Nisour Square in central Baghdad, while an insurgency raged against US and Allied forces throughout the country. The PMC companies and personnel – mercenaries - operate independent of US military command.48 Under the pretext of a civilian car deemed a threat by Blackwater employees, their vehicles opened fire at the suspect car as well as other cars in the busy intersection. Fourteen Iraqi civilians were killed and twenty wounded. The initial vehicle was later occupied by a family and posed no threat to the Americans; all the occupants were killed by gunshots and grenades. The dead ranged from a child of 9 to a grandfather aged 77.49

In December 2008, a federal grand jury indicted five members of Blackwater on four charges: voluntary manslaughter, attempt to commit manslaughter, using and discharging a firearm in a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting a crime.50 After appeal and re-hearings, the case against the defendants did not begin until 2014, and the action against one of the defendants was dropped.51 At trial, all four were convicted; Nicholas Slatten was convicted of first-degree murder and received a life sentence, the remaining three were given sentences of 30 years each.52

On December 22, 2020, Trump pardoned all the Blackwater defendants. The statement read, in part, “The pardon of these four veterans is broadly supported by the public, including Pete Hegseth…Mr. Slatten, Mr. Slough, Mr. Liberty, and Mr. Heard have a long history of service to the Nation.”53

7. Eliminating the Law of Armed Conflict

In what could be seen as a preemptive step toward deploying UCI to benefit war criminals of the future, on 1 April 2025, the US Army announced that it would no longer require troops [outside those at the US Military Academy, ROTC, and Officer Candidate School] to undergo instruction in the Laws of War.54 Until now, this has been the only point in a basic soldier’s annual training where they were introduced to the Geneva Conventions – the imperative to take prisoners, to treat them and the civilian population humanely, to refrain from unnecessary damage to persons or property, that targeting civilians was prohibited by US and international law, in-depth explanations of what constitutes a war crime and the duty to refuse illegal orders.55 It is unreasonable to expect an 18-year old private to refuse an order to kill all the inhabitants of a village if no one has bothered to tell him he has an affirmative duty to refuse. Indeed, our war crimes track record56 indicates that we need more, not less focus on the laws of war. Secretary of Defense Hegseth has other ideas.57

8. Eliminating the Gate Keepers

In February 2025, Hegseth simultaneously fired The Judge Advocates General (TJAG) of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The TJAGs are the general officers responsible for military justice and uniformed legal advisors in their respective services. As one correspondent noted, “Beyond its statutory responsibilities, TJAG is often perceived “as a conscience of the military and a moral guide as to what’s right and wrong.” Congress affords TJAG—and all judge advocates—the power and protection to be that conscience, explicitly prohibiting any officer or employee of the Department of Defense from interfering with TJAG’s ability to give independent legal advice to the department Secretary or Chief of Staff and from interfering with any judge advocate’s ability to give independent legal advice to commanders.” Further, Hegseth reduced the TJAG from three stars to two. The replacement Air Force and Army TJAGs were selected from politically reliable officers of the state National Guard, bypassing professional officers in the regular Army.58 Hegseth noted that “the removals were necessary because he didn’t want them to pose any ‘roadblocks to orders that are given by a commander in chief.’”59

The through-line of using UCI to pardon war criminals in past conflicts should be expected to continue as part of a larger effort to normalize situations where crimes can occur with impunity. As of April 2025, the Trump Administration plans the elimination of the State Department Office of Global Criminal Justice, which oversees US foreign policy in the areas of war crimes and genocide.60 Trump has also sanctioned both the International Criminal Court as a whole and individuals in the prosecutor’s office. While this has minimal impact on the US armed services (the US never ratified the Rome Statute creating the ICC), it evidences profound disdain for even the concept of international criminal law.61

And one last item. In his 2024 book The War on Warriors, Hegseth shares his thoughts about international criminal and humanitarian law:

“The key question of our generation – of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – is way more complicated: what do you do if your enemy does not honor the Geneva conventions? We never got an answer. Only more war. More casualties. And no victory. What if we treated the enemy the way they treated us?” he asks. “Would that not be an incentive for the other side to reconsider their barbarism? Hey, Al Qaeda: if you surrender, we might spare your life. If you do not, we will rip your arms off and feed them to hogs.”

We are just fighting with one hand behind our back – and the enemy knows it … If our warriors are forced to follow rules arbitrarily and asked to sacrifice more lives so that international tribunals feel better about themselves, aren’t we just better off winning our wars according to our own rules?!”62

9. Coda

The doctrine of Unlawful Command Influence originated as a shield for troops against command excesses. Now it is the only way to make sense of how the President has derailed prosecutions and sentences that run counter to ideological goals. There is no other reasonable interpretation of the evidence. The motive is evident: to appeal to a constituency that celebrates the notion that “our boys” can do no wrong, particularly when the victims are non-Americans. This is the true lesson from Lorance, Golsteyn, Gallagher, Blackwater, et al. Yet, the idea that the president can violate Article 37 in courts-martial by sabotaging the prosecution and sentencing has never been tested, although it satisfies fully the language of the Article. It should go without saying that any JAG prosecutor brave enough to raise the issue of UCI would be committing career suicide, probably worse.

For 250 years, military lawyers have ensured the rule of law, provided accountability, stressed morals, and promoted ethical values.63 It is not a perfect system but it succeeds far more often than it falls short. However, the purposeful destruction of that system and the concomitant implied permission for service members to escape justice for future war crimes is happening in real time, right before our eyes. As Tolstoy asked, “What then must we do?”64

Notes

  1. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C14-1/ALDE_00001076/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  2. Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), 2024 edition at jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/2024%20MCM%20files/MCM%20(2024%20ed)%20(2024_01_02)%20(adjusted%20bookmarks).pdf [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  3. Rules for Court Martial (R.C.M.) 203 (b), p. 15, included in the MCM. ↑

  4. 10 U.S. Code § 832 - Art. 32 at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/832 [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  5. MCM, Article 27 at /jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/2024%20MCM%20files/Supplemental%20Material%20-%202024%20ed.pdf?ver=MOhX1c1Yj6V0ghDyTP8uFw%3D%3D [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  6. The National Defense Authorization Act in 2022 and 2023 altered the UCMJ to remove certain offenses from command discretion, creating the Office for Special Trial Counsel in cases of murder, sexual assault, domestic violence, child abuse, kidnapping and other serious criminal offenses, as well as mandating a randomized selection of panel members instead of that process being commander-directed. Michael Lewis, “Major Changes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice,” American Bar Association, 7 Oct. 2022 at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/resources/jd-record/2022/major-changes-uniform-code-military-justice/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  7. Six civilian officials can also act as convening authority: President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Secretary of Homeland Security. In our present circumstances this means Donald Trump, Pete Hegseth, three political appointees, and Kristi Noem. See 10 U.S. Code § 822 - Art. 22 at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/822 [Accessed 26 Sept 2025] ↑

  8. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2006) at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/837 [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  9. E.g. United States v. Adamiak, 4 USCMA 412 (1954) is foundational. See also United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 19 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Villareal, 52 M.J. 27, 30 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Wallace, 39 M.J. 284, 286 (C.M.A. 1994). In United States v. Sayler (C.A.A.F. 2013) a finding of UCI led to the dismissal of charges. ↑

  10. United States v. Richter , 51 M.J. 213, 224 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting Biagase , 50 M.J. at 143, 150 (C.A.A.F. 1999)). ↑

  11. James F. Garrett, Mark “Max” Maxwell, Matthew A. Calarco, Franklin D. Rosenblatt, “Lawful Command Emphasis: Talk Offense, Not Offender; Talk Process, Not Results,” The Army Lawyer, August 2014, p.14 at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4877860 [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  12. Ibid. ↑

  13. SUBCOMM. ON CONST. RTS. OF THE S. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., REP. ON CONST. RTS. OF MILITARY PERS. 16 (Comm. Print 1963), at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/const-rights-milpers. pdf [hereinafter CONST. RTS. REPORT] (quoting a 5 February 1962 letter from General George Decker, Army Chief of Staff, on the subject of command influence). [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] Decker was CoS from 1960-62. ↑

  14. Criminal Law Deskbook, US Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School at https://tjaglcs.army.mil/criminallawdeskbook/topic/02_Unlawful_Command_Influence/loc/TopicHistory/ShowHistory/58. [Accessed 25 Sept 2025] It is filled with citations to military cases involving UCI, and the 10 Commandments of UCI in Appendix A is particularly helpful. ↑

  15. See Joshua Kastenberg, “Fears of Tyranny: The fine line between Presidential authority over military discipline and unlawful command influence through the lens of miliary legal history in the era of Bergdahl,” Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Issue 1, 2020. ↑

  16. There are 30-40 soldiers in an infantry platoon. The 4th BCT was deactivated in 2014. Drew Brooks, “4th Brigade Combat Team Shut Down by Army Restructuring, Fayetteville Observer,” 15 May 2014 at https://www.fayobserver.com/story/news/military/2014/05/15/4th-brigade-combat-team-shut/22163671007/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  17. Nathaniel Penn, “The Last Patrol,” California Sunday Magazine, 27 Sept. 2020 at https://story.californiasunday.com/clint-lorance-court-martial-pardon-the-last-patrol/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  18. Kyle Rempfer, “Army officer convicted of murder to get another look by civilian court,” Army Times, 1 July 2019 at https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/07/01/army-officer-convicted-of-murder-in-afghanistan-to-get-another-look-by-civilian-court/ [Accessed 25 Sept 2025] ↑

  19. At trial, Lorance was revealed to have threatened the families of local Afghan civilians and ordered his men to shoot in the direction of a nearby village to scare them into compliance. United States v. Clint A. Lorance, Army Court of Criminal Appeals at https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4661777/united-states-v-first-lieutenant-clint-a-lorance/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  20. https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/Apps/ACCAOpinions/ACCAOpinions.nsf/MOD/331E0265DC59E54F8525814E006BA1DC/$FILE/mo-lorance,%20ca.pdf [Accessed 25 Sept 2025] ↑

  21. Elizabeth Crisp, “US Rep Garrett plays key role in getting presidential pardon, eyes more cases,” The Advocate, 8 Dec. 2019 at https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/article_edfc9d08-0d7b-11ea-a7e8-eb6ac6c39f4c.html [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  22. The Internet Archive Wayback Machine at https://web.archive.org/web/20200111095927/https://gohmert.house.gov/uploadedfiles/scanned_letter_signed_for_lorance_with_hice.pdf [Accessed 26 Sept 2025] ↑

  23. YouTube, “Fox News Exclusive: Clint Lorance gives first interview since pardon by Trump” at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ne3AX9tasKY [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  24. Ibid. ↑

  25. Maggie Haberman, “Trump Brings 2 Officers He Cleared of War Crimes Onstage at Fund-Raiser,” New York Times, 8 Dec. 2019 at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/us/politics/trump-war-crimes-pardons.html. For photos of Trump posing with both Lorance and Matthew Golsteyn at his political rally: https://www.uap.org/case/matthew-golsteyn/ [Accessed 25 Sept 2025] ↑

  26. https://www.linkedin.com/in/clintlorance/ [Accessed 24 Sept 2025] The best book on the subject is Annie Jacobson, First Platoon: A Story of Modern War in the Age of Identity Dominance (Hialeah, FL: 2021) ↑

  27. During the same period, Trump’s statements in another court-martial, that of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl – which said Berdahl should be executed – led to that conviction being overturned on the basis of UCI. https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/opinions/2019OctTerm/190406.pdf [Accessed 28 September 2025] ↑

  28. Golsteyn maintained afterward that the burning was to prevent the spread of disease. No other members of his unit were charged in the incident. ↑

  29. Dan Lamothe, “See documents excerpts in the Army’s war crimes case against a Green Beret war hero,” The Washington Post, 19 May 2015 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/05/19/see-document-excerpts-in-the-armys-war-crimes-case-against-a-green-beret-war-hero/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  30. Helene Cooper, Michael Tackett and Taimoor Shah, “Twist in Green Beret’s Extraordinary Story: Trump’s Intervention After Murder Charges,” The New York Times, 16 Dec. 2018 at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/us/politics/major-matt-golsteyn-trump.html [Accessed 26 Sept 2025] ↑

  31. https://www.uap.org/case/matthew-golsteyn/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  32. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-97/ [Accessed 25 Sept 2025] ↑

  33. Mathew Golsteyn, No. AR20200000309, Army Bd. for Corr. of Mil. Records, 11 (June 26, 2020) ↑

  34. Navy Times staff, “What motivated fellow SEALs to dime out Eddie Gallagher?” Navy Times, 22 April 2019 at https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/04/22/what-motivated-fellow-seals-to-dime-out-eddie-gallagher/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  35. Carl Prine, “Thanks to SEAL’s immunity deals, confessed killer unlikely to be charged,” The Navy Times, 24 June 2019 at https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/06/24/thanks-to-seals-immunity-deals-confessed-killer-unlikely-to-be-charged/ [Accessed 26 Sept 2025] ↑

  36. Gallagher’s attorney, Tim Parlatore, would later represent Pete Hegseth when the soon-to-be SECDEF tried to enforce a non-disclosure agreement against a woman who accused him of sexual assault. He also represented Trump himself following the indictment in the retention of classified documents case brought by Special Prosecutor Jack Smith. Parlatore remains Hegseth’s personal attorney. Hegseth direct-commissioned Parlatore to Lieutenant Colonel and tasked him to review JAG training and employment. Daniel Lippman and Jost Gerstein, “Hegseth attorney’s dual roles trip conflict-of-interest alarms,” Politico, 3 May 2025 at https://www.politico.com/news/2025/05/03/parlatore-hegseth-navy-conflict-00323266 [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  37. Dave Phillips, “Navy SEAL Chief accused of war crimes is found not guilty of murder, “The New York Times, 2 Jul. 2019 at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/navy-seal-trial-verdict.html [Accessed 26 Sept 2025] ↑

  38. Hunter was later convicted (March 2020) in federal court of embezzling political campaign funds to support the five affairs he was having with women that were not his wife (she was also convicted as being part of the same scheme). He was sentenced to 11 months in federal prison. Trump pardoned him in December 2020, one month before his sentence was scheduled to begin. His wife received her Trump pardon the next day. ↑

  39. Oliver Darcy, “Fox News host Pete Hegseth has privately encouraged Trump to pardon servicemen accused of war crimes,” CNN, 21 May 2019 at https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/21/media/fox-news-pete-hegseth-trump-pardon-war-crimes/index.html [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  40. Dave Phillips, “Navy Reduces Punishment for SEAL in War Crimes Case,” The New York Times, 25 Nov. 2019 at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/us/navy-seal-gallagher-clemency.html [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] Please note, under Article 2, Section II of the US Constitution, the President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces. His every “suggestion” carries with it an implied order. Since the Supreme Court decided in 2023 that the president is presumptively immune from all official acts, there are almost literally no limits to his power to direct the armed forces and their individual commanders in whatever manner he sees fit, be it legal or otherwise. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  41. Navy Times Staff, “Report: Trump makes SEAL Gallagher a chief again,” Navy Times, 4 Nov. 2019 at https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/11/04/report-trump-makes-seal-gallagher-a-chief-again/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] and Trump’s tweet on the matter: “I was not pleased with the way that Navy Seal Eddie Gallagher’s trial was handled by the Navy. He was treated very badly but, despite this, was completely exonerated on all major charges. I then restored Eddie’s rank.” https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1198746358091530241 [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  42. https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1198574811678683137 [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  43. https://x.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1197507542726909952 [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  44. John Fritze, “Trump ramps up attacks on ‘deep state,’ focuses on Pentagon amid Eddie Gallagher controversy,” USA Today, 27 Nov. 2019 at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/11/27/trump-calls-pentagon-deep-state-amid-eddie-gallagher-controversy/4323327002/ [Accessed 26 Sept 2025] ↑

  45. White House press statement, 6 May 2019 at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-executive-clemency-michael-behenna/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  46. https://books.google.com/books?id=YjhSzQEACAAJ ↑

  47. https://www.apple.com/tv-pr/originals/the-line/ This is a four-part documentary on the case. I recommend it. ↑

  48. In this instance, Blackwater provided “security” to the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. ↑

  49. US Department of Justice Press Release, 22 Oct. 2014 at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/four-former-blackwater-employees-found-guilty-charges-fatal-nisur-square-shooting-iraq [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  50. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Grand Jury indictment at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2008/12/08/grandjury.pdf [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  51. David Ingram, “Blackwater guards face new U.S. charges for Iraq shooting deaths,” Reuters, 17 Oct. 2013 at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-blackwater-idUSBRE99G1A320131017/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  52. Matt Apuzzo, “Ex-Blackwater Guards Given Long Terms for Killing Iraqis,” The New York Times, 13 April 2015 at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/us/ex-blackwater-guards-sentenced-to-prison-in-2007-killings-of-iraqi-civilians.html [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  53. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-executive-grants-clemency-122220/ [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  54. Patty Nieberg, “Here is the training that the Army says is no longer mandatory,” Task and Purpose, 1 Apr. 2025 at https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-training-changes-optional/#:~:text=The%2520Army%2520is%2520removing%2520resiliency,and%2520more%2520up%2520to%2520commanders. [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  55. Law of War Documentary Supplement (International and Operational Law Department, The United States Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School: Charlottesville, VA, 2024) at https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/lawofwar.pdf and https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm27-10.pdf [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  56. Parker Yesko, “In the Dark: The war crimes that the military buried,” The New Yorker, 10 Sept. 2024 at https://www.newyorker.com/podcast/in-the-dark/the-war-crimes-that-the-military-buried [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  57. In May 1941, Hitler issued the Erlass über die Ausübung der Kriegsgerichtsbarkeit im Gebiet „Barbarossa“ und über besondere Maßnahmen der Truppe (Decree on the exercise of military justice in the “Barbarossa” area and on special measures by the troops). One of its provisions was the suspension of punishment for crimes of the Wehrmacht against civilians except in cases where it was necessary to restore discipline. See US Holocaust Memorial Museum at www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/German-military-context-sheets.pdf. Prior to this, the Germany military, even under Hitler, still nominally abided by the Geneva and Hague Conventions, even putting the Zehn Gebote (Ten Commandments) for the honorable treatment of enemy captives and civilians in the paybook of soldiers. For example, “The civilian population is inviolable. A soldier may not arbitrarily engage in plunder or destruction.” Learning from the Nazi perversion of military justice, the modern German Bundeswehr operates under a philosophy called Innere Führung (Inner Leadership) which goes to great pains to explain to troops not only the basics of the Law of Armed Conflict but also specific instruction on when they are required to disobey orders. ↑

  58. The Army TJAG previously worked on behalf of the Trump administration on [non-existent] voter fraud investigations. Matt Zapotsky and Amy Gardiner, “New US Attorney in Atlanta brings in assistants who worked on voter fraud issues, raising fears of political interference.” The Washington Post, 8 Jan. 2021 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/atlanta-us-attorney-brings-in-assistants-who-worked-on-voter-fraud-issues-raising-fears-of-political-interference/2021/01/08/c4057f9a-51c9-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] and Jacob Shamsian, “The new Trump-appointed US Attorney in Georgia says he was surprised to find there wasn’t any election fraud,” Business Insider, 13 January 2021 at https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-appointed-us-attorney-georgia-161550950.html?guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAHphKBL840fekMWkLSNzM-c0AsJr-Gp5syLTs4PXTLHDpjlPjNZOU2rnDXAbKdDYbqf783wVobLGv6UUYXMdu9U_PcKTnXoe_ArqMBRj02SjDu4PlfFl9vPLNTWnRuFe90cYc-OH8dDUKag0Cc9q5crDkl7Pi0R-uOHnzDSPOl_I [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  59. Thomas Novelly and Konstantin Toropin, “‘People Are Very Scared’: Trump Administration Purge of JAG Officers Raises Legal, Ethical Fears,” Military.com, 24 Feb. 2025 at https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/02/24/people-are-very-scared-trump-administration-purge-of-jag-officers-raises-legal-ethical-fears.html [Accessed 25 Sept 2025] ↑

  60. Tom Bateman, “Trump administration proposes State Department cuts in major overhaul,” BBC News at https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yg2y21yq5o.amp [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  61. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court/ and https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/06/imposing-sanctions-in-response-to-the-iccs-illegitimate-actions-targeting-the-united-states-and-israel [Accessed 27 Sept 2025]; the orders also affect some 900 staff members of the ICC who risk arrest if they attempt to enter the United States. He did this in his first term, too: Human Rights Watch, “US Sanctions on the International Criminal Court,” 14 Dec. 2020. “On September 2, 2020, the United States government imposed sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and another senior prosecution official, Phakiso Mochochoko. In addition, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that the United States had restricted the issuance of visas for certain unnamed individuals “involved in the ICC’s efforts to investigate US personnel.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/14/us-sanctions-international-criminal-court [Accessed 27 Sept 2025] ↑

  62. Jason Wilson, The Guardian, 25 Nov. 2024 at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/25/pete-hegseth-book-attacks-nato-alliances [Accessed 26 Sept 2025] ↑

  63. The Army JAG Corps was founded on 29 July 1775. ↑

  64. Leo Tolstoy, What then must we do? (Devon: Green Books, 1991). It was first published in 1886 and references Luke 3:10 (“Quid ergo nos faciemus?” in the Vulgate) about coming judgment, repentance, and ethical behavior. ↑

Cite this article

Mark M. Hull, ‘Unlawful Command Influence: Why we don’t care about war crimes anymore’ (2026) 1 OULPR 99